Abducted children and youth in Lord’s Resistance Army in Northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC): mechanisms of indoctrination and control by Jocelyn TD Kelly et al.
RESEARCH Open Access
Abducted children and youth in Lord’s
Resistance Army in Northeastern
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC):
mechanisms of indoctrination and control
Jocelyn TD Kelly1*, Lindsay Branham2 and Michele R. Decker3,4
Abstract
Background: Globally, an estimated 300,000 children under the age of 18 participate in combat situations; those
in armed groups in particular suffer prolonged exposure to psychological and physical abuse. The Lord’s Resistance
Army (LRA) is a rebel movement known for its widespread conscription of children; yet little is known about this
process once the group moved beyond northern Uganda. In this paper, we describe the processes related to
abduction and indoctrination of youth by the LRA in northeastern Democratic Republic of the Congo ( DRC).
Methods: In-depth interviews were conducted with formerly abducted children, their family members, community
leaders, and service providers (total n = 34) in four communities in LRA-affected areas of northeastern DRC.
Inductive coding of transcripts was undertaken to identify salient themes.
Results: Informants articulated a range of practices by the LRA to exert high levels of control over new recruits,
including strict social isolation from recent abductees; control of communication; promoting new identity formation;
and compelling children to act out strictly defined gendered roles. Witchcraft and secrecy are used to intimidate
recruits and to magnify perception of the group’s power. These methods promote de-identification with one’s civilian
and family life; and eventually the assimilation of a new language and identity.
Conclusion: Indoctrination of newly abducted children into the LRA occurs via a complex system of control. This study
provides one of the first detailed explorations of social and psychological mechanisms through which this is achieved,
and focuses particularly on the gendered differences in the indoctrination process. Results support past findings that
the LRA is a strategic and well-organized organization in its approach to enlisting child soldiers. Understanding some
of the ways in which the LRA controls its recruits and the psychological impact of indoctrination enables reintegration
programs to more effectively address these issues and serve the complex needs of formerly abducted children.
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Background
An estimated 300,000 children under the age of 18 actively
take part in combat, or serve as support personnel, for
armed groups in more than 30 conflicts worldwide [1].
Children may be forcibly recruited, abducted or coerced
into joining non-state armed groups [2]. Once enrolled,
these children face prolonged exposure to violence,
including but not limited to being forced to kill or harm
others, and repeated personal victimization, including
sexual violence [3]. Children are considered even more
vulnerable than adults to detrimental effects of these
experiences, which occur during their formative years [4]
and are robbed of many of the standard opportunities for
physical, emotional, and intellectual development.
The Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA) is a rebel move-
ment known for its widespread conscription of children
and history of perpetrating human rights abuses. Origin-
ating in northern Uganda in the late 1980s, the group is
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responsible for the abduction of at least 20,000
children and the displacement of over 1.9 million
people in Northern Uganda [5]. Seminal work on the
LRA’s operations in Northern Uganda clarified the
LRA’s methods of forced recruitment and psycho-
logical control. The LRA is described as preferentially
abducting children and adolescents due to the relative
ease of indoctrinating youth, and their tendency to stay
longer in the group, and their tendency to exhibit more
loyalty [6]. Methods of indoctrination included the
promise of material gains, such as rewards when
the LRA toppled the Ugandan government; the use of
misinformation (limiting access to peace-oriented
radio messages); the use of violence and the threat of
punishment; moving new abductees far from home to
disorient them; and inculcating new members to a
shared magical belief system. Self-reported loyalty to
the LRA was high among abductees, and increased
with time in the group [6].
In 2005, however, the LRA was forced to expand its
territory and seek operating bases in neighboring coun-
tries in response to military pressure from the Ugandan
government in an attempt to regain stability in the
northern region of the country. The LRA expanded
across the western border of Uganda to the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC) as well as to the north in
South Sudan, and Central African Republic (CAR). Ex-
pansion into DRC and other countries presents a unique
challenge to the rebel group, which has based its identity
and much of its philosophy in pride around an Acholi
tribal identity. Outside of Uganda, the LRA’s abductees
include those with different backgrounds, language and
culture, adding a layer of complexity to the forced indoc-
trination process as their historical leveraging of the
Acholi tribal identity as a reason to fight with the group
is no longer relevant [7]. Yet unclear is the means of in-
doctrination in contexts outside of Uganda that do not
share a common language, tribe, history or culture. It is
critical to understand how the LRA may have changed
or adapted its behaviors in response to the diffusion of
the group across the central Africa region. Considering
potential gender differences in these experiences is also
critical. In a report to the Security Council, the United
Nations estimated that between July 2009 and February
2012, the LRA had abducted 591 children, with a
roughly even split between girls and boys in the DRC,
South Sudan and CAR [8].
The theoretical grounding for understanding indoc-
trination practices is sparse. However, in an examination
of identity construction experienced by returning former
child soldiers in Uganda, Veale and Stavrou [9] note the
extent to which identity is constructed through relation-
ships between inductees to a new culture, and the long
term practitioners who take on a role of modeling
accepted behaviours. This learning process is enacted
through daily activities and through social relations with
the older, “expert” actors in a group [9].
The stages of this kind of learning and indoctrination
process were examined in detail in an exploration of
how youth become “insiders” in different types of violent
communities. In the article “Becoming a Committed In-
sider,” Hundeide [10] compares case studies of children
joining neo-Nazi groups in Europe with the experiences
of child soldiers in Angola and Sierra Leone. While em-
phasizing that there may be different motivations and
pathways to transitioning from “outsider” to “insider” in
a violent group, she outlines the following steps, which
may occur in tandem or in different order as youth iden-
tify with a violent sub-culture: separation and anxiety;
identification with the aggressor; terror and the breaking
of pre-existing emotional bonds; undermining earlier
morals; isolation and indoctrination of new values;
demonization of the enemy or “outsider”; and finally, be-
coming insiders into the new group.
Terror and the breaking of previous ties may take
the form of committing the most extreme forms of
violence against one’s own community. This can serve
to then undermine earlier morals as well as make new
recruits feel isolated and bound to a new set of values.
Betancourt et al. found that two forms of violence –
killing and rape – were particularly damaging to long-
term mental health outcomes for children formerly
associated with armed groups [11]. Further supporting
this finding is evidence from a study with former child
soldiers in Uganda, which found that being forced to
kill, and witnessing killing were reportedly the two
worst kinds of experiences they underwent [12]. The
findings from Betancourt et al and Ertl provide evi-
dence that certain extreme forms of violence do in-
deed create a lasting break with accepted norms, and
may carry consequences far after an individual leaves
an armed group.
This study explores how different practices associated
with indoctrination – particularly isolation, assignment
to a new family structure and forced violence – may
serve as the most effective way to make new recruits feel
that they have been irrevocably dissociated from their
civilian identities, and that they would no longer be ac-
cepted in their own communities.
The growing recognition of the role youth play in con-
flict [13–16], and recognition of the trauma they are ex-
posed to [3, 17–21] has brought increasing efforts to
improve reintegration programming. However, service
providers often struggle to address the needs of children
associated with armed groups. Systematically under-
standing the experiences of abductees in this context,
and creating programs that specifically address these
experiences, could improve programming in this area.
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Examining the experiences of children indoctrinated into
the LRA, and particularly the psychological dimensions
of their experience, can inform context-appropriate ser-
vices to best address their needs upon return to civilian
communities. This research begins to fill this gap by ex-
ploring the LRA’s mechanisms of indoctrination after its
expansion into neighboring nations. We describe LRA
indoctrination of abducted children and young adults in
northeastern DRC, as reported by former abductees,
their family members, and other key informants in LRA-
affected communities.
Methods
The study was conducted in the Haut Uele district
within the Orientale Province of northeastern DRC, a
rural region bordered by South Sudan to the north,
Central African Republic to the west and Uganda to the
east. The predominant tribe is Zande, who traditionally
engage in subsistence agriculture, while the minority
nomadic pastoralist tribe, the Mbororo, move across the
region seasonally. In 2011, during the time that this re-
search was carried out, the United Nations Office for the
Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) re-
ported that 443,702 people had been displaced by the
LRA in the Orientale Province since 2003, with roughly
60 % of this displacement (257,265 individuals) occur-
ring in Haute Uele. The towns of Dungu and Faradje
were home to over three-quarters of those displaced in
Haute Uele [22].
Semi-structured qualitative interviews were under-
taken with informants in four communities in LRA-
affected areas of northeastern DRC: Duru, Faradje,
Limai and Dungu. These communities were chosen be-
cause they were among the most affected by the LRA,
according to informal interviews with local leaders,
non-governmental organization (NGO) staff and other
key-informants. At each project site, the research team,
consisting of a local religious leader, a local translator
and two U.S. researchers, first met with local commu-
nity leadership to describe the planned project, answer
questions, and obtain project approval. In the Dungu
site, interviews were also conducted at a nearby dis-
placement camp with roughly 4000 residents, to exam-
ine the needs of those displaced throughout Haut Uele.
Sample and recruitment
Recruitment occurred via snowball sampling. The team
began with multilateral organizations and international
NGOs working with communities affected by the LRA in
the sample area, and obtained referrals to additional key
actors who had experience working with LRA-affected
communities and individuals: these included international
NGOs, local religious organizations and community-
based organizations. The team ceased seeking out new
informants when they were no longer receiving new refer-
rals. Since family, community members and service pro-
viders are deeply affected by LRA violence, and are closely
involved in the reintegration of formerly abducted youth;
these individuals were sought for interviews to provide
their perspective on the conscription of children and the
process of reintegration. Data was de-identified except for
demographic characteristics (age, role in the community).
The final sample (n = 34) included formerly abducted chil-
dren (n = 7), their family members (n = 3), community
leaders (n = 11), service providers (medical and educa-
tional staff and NGO workers (n = 13).
Data collection and analysis
The semi-structured interview guide was designed based
on informational interviews with NGO staff and commu-
nity members in affected areas, and refined after pilot in-
terviews in Dungu. Interviews were conducted in Zande
(the local tribal language), or French, based on participant
preference. Following a semi-structured guide, partici-
pants were asked to describe their understanding of LRA
abduction practices, whether experienced personally or
understood through the context of service provision, the
impact of the LRA, feelings of vulnerability, any gender
differences in experiences with the LRA, reintegration of
children and adults formerly abducted by the LRA into
communities, and community coping and resilience strat-
egies towards the ongoing insecurity. Probes were used to
elicit details. A translator and one to two researchers were
present at each interview. Interviews were transcribed ver-
batim during the interviews. These notes were combined
for completeness, and were reviewed for accuracy and
translated into English language for analysis.
Procedures aligned with ethical guidance for research
with children in war-affected populations [23, 24]. Con-
sent procedures emphasized the voluntary nature of par-
ticipation. Local interviewers were trained in qualitative
research techniques and were service providers with
local organizations that had experience working with
LRA-affected populations. In accordance with best prac-
tices, interviewers were trained to monitor participants
for possible distress, and emphasized that respondents
could refuse any question. All respondents were inter-
viewed in private locations. Interviewers were trained
using training materials developed from materials pro-
vided by a university IRB. The training materials covered
core ethical concepts including: privacy and confidential-
ity, proportionality, risk, consent, beneficence. All
IRB materials were translated into French and were
printed and reviewed in depth with local research staff
during a 2-day training. Referrals for mental health ser-
vices were provided to all participants following the
interview. This work was undertaken as part of an NGO
needs assessment, and as such was deemed exempt by
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the Harvard School of Public Health Institutional Review
Board. Community leaders and service provision organi-
zations reviewed and provided input on procedures, and
gave permission to engage with community members.
Inductive coding was undertaken through close read-
ing of all of the transcripts to identify salient themes.
Two research team members generated themes inde-
pendently; those that were agreed upon by both re-
searchers were defined as codes. Themes were refined
through an iterative process during the coding of the
transcripts to capture emerging themes and subthemes.
Through this process, key unifying themes and relation-
ships among these themes were identified. Coding was
undertaken by one team member and cross-checked by
another. Consistently appearing themes within categor-
ies were captured as subcategories. Data was coded in a
database in Microsoft Excel (Microsoft Excel 2011;
Version 14.0.0).
Results
Themes are presented in roughly the same order as the
process of indoctrination: abduction; steps undertaken
by the LRA to establish control through isolation and
control of communication; the use of public punishment
to intimidate and deter escape; assignment to a unit
within the hierarchy; and, finally, markers of the transi-
tion into becoming a full LRA soldier. The last theme
explores the use of witchcraft to intimidate recruits and
to magnify perception of the group’s power throughout
the indoctrination process. Table 1 summarizes the
mechanisms of control and Table 2 illustrates the gen-
dered similarities and differences throughout the process
of indoctrination.
Abduction
In this study area, respondents universally emphasized
the violent and coercive nature of abduction by the
LRA. Kidnappings often occurred as part of a larger at-
tack on a village. Interviewees described a preference by
the LRA to take children and youth, rather than adults,
because children are easier to control. They also noted
that both boys and girls were vulnerable to being taken.
“Children are abducted by force into the LRA. They
don't have a choice to accept or not accept. If you
accept to go, you live. If you don't accept they kill you.”
-Religious Leader
“Children never volunteer, they are kidnapped on the
road, on the field, even in the village, that are trained
in a military way and become the LRA.” - Mother of a
formerly abducted child
Respondents expressed how the LRA preferred to ab-
duct children, who could more easily be indoctrinated to
the group’s practices, compared to adults.
“For men, it is terrible because when LRA finds you,
you are killed directly, no discussion. Children will be
kidnapped.” – Leader of a displacement camp
“We started looting people and killing people,
abducting children from the village and bringing them
to the [LRA] camp. Those who were older, we would
kill them.” – 17 year-old male abductee
There was consensus among the respondents that
boys and girls were equally vulnerable to being
Table 1 Mechanisms of control
Isolation from others who share a common
language and culture
“If they see you talk with one person frequently, they think you want to run away and they will beat
you up.”
“When they kidnap you, you just move without any rest and you can’t talk with each other, especially
those who were abducted. And if you do, they will say you are planning to run away and they will
beat you.”
Control of Language “If you are a boy, you stay with them 1 year, you learn the language and become a soldier.”
“When I was kidnapped since I didn’t know their language – they were forcing us and beating us to
learn their language”
Public Violence and Forced Complicity “They found 2 boys from the Zande tribe who tried to escape and they pulled other Zande boys from
the group and forced them to beat those who tried to escape with sticks until they died.”
“If one child tries to escape, they catch him, put him in the middle of a group of children and make
the children kill the child with a piece of wood and say if you try to escape we will kill you like that.”
Assignment to family structure with
gendered roles
“…normally when they train other kids to be LRA they put them under someone’s responsibility.”
“My job was basically to carry kids, cooking and carrying things when we were moving… [The man
they gave me to] had other wives.” (female abductee)
“Boys in the LRA are transporters, then they give the gris gris and they become LRA.” (male abductee)
Witchcraft “When children come back [from the LRA], they are troubled, mean. They don’t play with others. They
have gris gris that torments them.”
“ The behavior [of the recipients] changes when they get witchcraft…”
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abducted by the LRA. However, once within the
group, gender roles were rigidly defined. “All are
vulnerable to abduction - girls and boys.” - Chief of
Duru village
“Boys and girls are equally vulnerable. Boys are
fighters, porters. Girls are wives and get pregnant.” –
18 year-old female abductee
However, once within the group, gender roles were ri-
gidly defined and strictly enforced through a number of
mechanisms. One of the first and most striking aspects
of life in the LRA is the strict control of roles and behav-
iors that those in power exercise over others.
Isolation and control of communication
Male and female respondents described the forced in-
doctrination process in similar terms. After being kid-
napped, many new abductees reported being forced to
march for hours and sometimes days into the forest.
During this time forward, abductees were not allowed to
speak in their native languages or communicate with
others. Former abductees said that these measures were
intended to prevent children from bonding with each
other and from forming escape plans.
“[We] couldn’t talk to other abducted kids. We just sat
and slept the three days I was with the LRA.” -
17 year-old male abductee
Congolese children describe spending days hiking and
transporting looted goods, or sitting in groups to rest in
total silence.
“If they see you talk with one person frequently, they
think you want to run away and they will beat you
up.” Another girl reinforced this, saying, “When they
kidnap you, you just move without any rest and you
can’t talk with each other, especially those who were
abducted. And if you do, they will say you are
planning to run away and they will beat you.”-
16 year-old female abductee
Isolation was focused on ensuring that fellow
abductees did not interact or bond with each other.
However, interaction with, and assimilation to, the
language and customs of long-term combatants was
cultivated, ensuring that one’s ties to a civilian
identity were broken while new ties to an LRA iden-
tity were reinforced.
Forced language acquisition & language as indication of
identity
Participants described a number of ways that the LRA
has adapted to the challenge of working in a country
that does not share a language or common identity with
the combatants. Respondents emphasize that recruits
have different backgrounds, language and culture than
the majority of the LRA1- adding a layer of complexity
to the process of forced indoctrination. This is a chal-
lenge the group has addressed with brutal efficiency,
severely beating any new members who talk amongst
themselves as well as those who use a language other
than Acholi. This compels abductees to quickly learn the
language of the LRA in order to communicate.
“We couldn’t talk to other abducted kids. We just sat
and slept…”- 17-year-old male abductee (from
Faradje)
This is most pronounced in those cases where children
are assigned new names –effectively stripping them of
their identities and rechristening them as members of
the LRA.
“When I was kidnapped since I didn’t know their
language – they were forcing us and beating us to
learn their language… When they abduct you they ask
your name and then if it’s too difficult they give you a
new name.” – 17-year-old male abductee (from
Dungu)
Community members as well as former abductees
closely linked learning the Acholi language with the
process of taking on a LRA identity. While not all com-
munity members associated the Acholi language with
LRA soldiers, there was wide recognition of the fact that
abductees who spent enough time in the group learned
this language.
“If you are a boy, you stay with them one year; you
learn the language and become a soldier.” – 18 year-
old female abductee
“Once we hear Acholi we think he is the enemy even if
they are not in uniform.” - Leader displacement camp
Table 2 Phases of indoctrination
Girls Silence and
isolation
Assignment to a family structure,
learn Acholi language
Help with domestic tasks, become “bush wives if they are deemed old enough
Boys Silence and
isolation
Assignment to a family structure,
learn Acholi language
Given increasingly difficult tasks
to test their loyalty
Trained to become a soldier where they can earn the right
to carry a gun and be given a “wife”
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Service providers working with abductees stated that
children often avoided speaking this language once they
returned to their communities because it served as a
marker of being an outsider and emphasized their previ-
ous identity with the LRA. Abductees, family members
and service providers drew the connection between
speaking Acholi and being identified with the LRA.
“My daughter is behaving and is calm. She hasn’t
changed but I know a boy who spent much time in the
bush and he is angry, is violent and only knows
Acholi.”- Father of female abductee
Public punishment to intimidate
Public violence was described as a way to ensure that
abducted children were aware of the price of disobedi-
ence. Killing and beatings were used to discourage
escape in particular. Participants explained how LRA
command would bring the transgressor back to the
group and kill him or her in front of the other abductees
in order to send a public message.
“If one child tries to escape, they catch him, put him in
the middle of a group of children and make the
children kill the child with a piece of wood and say if
you try to escape we will kill you like that.” - Leader of
the refugee camp
“If someone tried to escape they would go, follow him,
bring him [back] and kill him,” - 17-year-old male
abductee
These practices were also used to purposefully decon-
struct social ties by forcing children to perpetrate violence
against someone similar who shared their tribe or ethnicity.
“…if a boy or girl tries to escape, they will be brought
back and put into a circle and all the boys and girls
will kill those children.” – Female NGO worker
“It is difficult to leave the LRA because they scare
children and say if you try to escape, they will chase
you and kill you. They found two boys from the Zande
tribe who tried to escape and they pulled other Zande
boys from the group and forced them to beat those
who tried to escape with sticks until they died.” –
18 year-old female abductee
The use of public violence not only served to in-
timidate children into staying in the group and obey-
ing orders; by forcing abductees to kill or beat their
peers, commanding officers used displays of violence
to break social ties and make children feel complicit
in the brutality.
Transience and instability
Life in the LRA was described as, above all, highly transi-
ent. Long periods of living in the forest were punctuated
by raids on villages where abducted Congolese children
witnessed and participated in violence, which also served
to break bonds with their civilian identities. This ex-
istence, characterized by constant movement and
punctuated by violence, meant that children had no
sense of stability or community beyond those they are
traveling with.
“What I was seeing was that, when there is no food, we
would go to houses and look for food and when they go
to the house they kill the owner of the house. We stay
in the bush until food is finished and when it’s finished
we go again to loot for food.” – 16 year-old female
abductee
Keeping abductees on the move ensured their survival
became dependent on the LRA commanders. Forced to
forage for food in the forest and to undergo spontaneous
fasting periods until the next raid, basic survival became
linked to obedience to the command structure and to
staying with the group.
Assignment to a “family” structure
Respondents described how each raid had the possibility
of bringing new recruits who were needed to help carry
the supplies from the village that had just been attacked.
This influx of new abductees meant that the LRA had to
find a more sustainable way beyond silence and isolation
to condition new members. This was done through
assigning abductees to a trusted older combatant, often
from Uganda, who already had an existing “family struc-
ture” consisting of one or multiple women who were
forced to act as wives as well as their children. Control
of new recruits was thus “contracted out” to smaller
units where more effective supervision was possible.
“There was somebody – the one who abducted me also
would give me some food – I was the one carrying his
food and his wife’s goods… He had a rank – the
ranking is complicated in LRA – normally when they
train other kids to be LRA they put them under
someone’s responsibility. So he was responsible for
those kids and other LRA members.” – 17 year-old
male abductee
In this “family” unit, abductees are the lowest ranking
members and are subject to beating and other abuse.
The children’s behavior in these units is highly con-
scribed. Girls are controlled not only by the combatant
they are assigned to, but also by other wives and family
members in that social unit.
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“When they abduct kids, especially girls, they
distribute them to the commanders – they say, 'you,
this is your husband, this is your husband.' Those who
are not mature will give to other commanders and say,
'you keep this kid until they are old enough to be your
wife'… My job was basically to carry kids, cooking and
carrying things when we were moving… [The man they
gave me to] had other wives. They were Ugandan.
They were not nice to me – the Ugandan wives.” –
16 year-old female abductee
For boys, this process reaches its final stages when they
are “graduated” to becoming combatants. This process in-
volves staying with the LRA for a significant amount of
time. Once boys have been with the group for a year or
more, participants described how boys were given increas-
ingly difficult tasks to test their loyalty, for instance being
sent on an errand to a distant place. His return was seen
as an indication of his loyalty to the group.
“Boys will be taken, if they don’t want to go back home
they will be trained as fighters, they will ask a boy
questions to see if he is trustworthy, then they will send
him to fetch water, if he keeps coming back, they will
train him.” – 18-year-old female abductee
The process of becoming a soldier can then begin, and
is characterized primarily by the use of witchcraft and se-
cretive rituals. In the final phase, a boy is given a gun and
eventually a wife so he can start his own “family” unit.
Witchcraft
Respondents describe the use of witchcraft, or gris gris
as it is often called in DRC, as a defining part of the
LRA experience. Although respondents often did not
know the purpose of the magical rites they experienced,
they placed an emphasis on its importance, and even
after escaping from the LRA expressed a fear of its
power. Magic was used at several points during the
abduction and conscription process; immediately upon
abduction, and later as a symbol of transition into be-
coming “true LRA.” A number of children describe
undergoing a magical ritual after first being abducted,
often in the form of oil or cutting.
“The LRA put the gris gris on our ankles and knees
and on our heads. It was oil in a small bottle. When
they abduct children they put this oil on them.” – 17-
year-old male abductee
“Only when they abducted us I saw that first they
apply witchcraft on the knees and on the ankles but I
don’t know why they applied it but they applied it.
They applied it on me. It was like an oil. Only that
first time – it never happened again. I don’t know
why.” – 16-year-old female abductee
“My son told me they took a razor and cut his right
leg, left leg and forehead when he was abducted. This
was a form of gris gris.” – Father of a male abductee
While some noted that magic was applied immediately
after abduction, it was also common to hear of gris gris
as a way to signal the transition from an abductee to a
true soldier.
“Mostly the chief of the [LRA] group is in charge of the
witchcraft and when someone stays with the LRA for
more than one year, they will choose who gets the
witchcraft and take them away from the group and
apply it on them… The behavior [of the recipients]
changes when they get witchcraft – they cooperate
amongst themselves they become very aggressive…Boys
in the LRA are transporters, then they give the gris
gris and they become LRA.”” – 17-year-old male
abductee
The descriptions of witchcraft seem to be a method
for describing the process of indoctrination that some
children undergo in the LRA, and shorthand for the ex-
tent to which children then become part of the group. A
local NGO worker in Limai explained:
“Normally the LRA makes some kind of witchcraft and
puts it on the kids – witchcraft from Uganda – we
don’t know how to undo this witchcraft. If it was done
here maybe we could undo it but it was done in
Uganda so we don’t know how to undo it… The
children bring bad things from the bush… once they
are brought to the bush with the LRA and given
witchcraft training or something; he comes back
different and brings bad things from the bush.” – Male
NGO worker in Limai
“Children [in villages] were mostly killed by LRA and
those kids who had witchcraft on them… Only kids
with the witchcraft would kill people.” – 17-year-old
male abductee
This was echoed by family members of abductees and
the children themselves, who looked at receiving witch-
craft as an indication of the mental changes one under-
goes in the group.
“They use drugs and gris gris in the LRA to change
attitudes but she [my daughter] didn’t take the magic
because she was hurt during her capture and so was
being healed rather than being indoctrinated.” –
Parent of female abductee
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“It is since the LRA didn’t apply their potion on me
that I am ok and my mind is ok.” – 17 year old male
abductee
“When children come back [from the LRA], they are
troubled, mean. They don’t play with others. They
have gris gris that torments them.” – Teacher from
Limai
Discussion
This study is among the first to examine the ways that
the LRA indoctrinates youth outside of northern
Uganda, where new recruits no longer share a common
cultural background or language with long-term soldiers.
These findings also contribute to the wider literature
examining the processes by which children are indoctri-
nated into violent organizations. The LRA has relied
heavily on forced recruitment and abduction of children
to fill its ranks, and has adapted systems for breaking
ties with civilian life and fostering new identity forma-
tion. Understanding the processes through which this
occurs, especially as the group expands into areas that
share no linguistic or cultural ties with the long-term
combatants, provides a rare insight into methods of in-
doctrination and psychological control for children asso-
ciated with armed groups. These findings illustrate a
highly regulated process of indoctrination in four project
sites in northeastern DRC. Participants described a
tightly-controlled process of manipulation, including:
immediate isolation from their peers and fellow abduc-
tees after abduction; forced acquisition of a new lan-
guage; constant movement and occasional violent raids
that serve to dissociate children with civilian life; assign-
ment of new abductees to a “family” structure where
they are supervised by a senior combatant and his wife
or wives; and finally, the use of witchcraft for intimida-
tion. This paper supports evidence that the LRA is a
strategic and well-organized organization, [25–28] des-
pite its depiction in Western media as an irrational band
of rebels with arcane religious beliefs [29].
These results also reinforce previous studies which
posit similar stages of identity formation. As noted in
the introduction, Hundeide outlines potential routes for
identifying with a violent sub-culture: separation and
anxiety; identification with the aggressor; terror and the
breaking of pre-existing emotional bonds; undermining
earlier morals; isolation and indoctrination of new
values; demonization of the enemy or “outsider”; and fi-
nally, becoming insiders into the new group [10]. These
findings emphasize how the LRA enforces separation
both from the civilian community (through abduction)
and from other abductees in the group who share a
tribal or ethnic identity (through control of language
and by separating recruits into smaller family units). The
use of family units and of a magical belief system helps
ensure that new recruits are controlled socially and
psychologically.
Studies from Sierra Leone [11] and Uganda [12]
reinforce the ways that extreme violence, including kill-
ing, rape, and being forced to witness killing, are espe-
cially harmful for youth in armed groups. It is notable
that being forced to perpetrate murder is one of the
defining experiences of many children associated with
the LRA, and is discussed by the respondents in this
study, as well as being noted in previous descriptions of
the LRA’s practices in Uganda. The use of violence and
punishment, and the movement far from home to pre-
vent escape, was also reported among Uganda recruits
[28]. The influence of evil spirits to control children and
as a barrier to reintegration is also consistent with find-
ings in the Ugandan context [30].
Current findings extend this literature by identifying
additional methods – such as control of communication
with those from a similar background and the forced
acquisition of language, that appear unique to the LRA’s
new context. Some methods seem to have been kept but
adapted. Current results suggest magic was used for in-
timidation, contrasting with past work in Uganda where
the magical belief system was described as a shared “cos-
mology” that both inspired and scared abductees [30]. In
the post-Ugandan context, magic has been documented
as highly instrumental in the LRA and is used to exert
psychological control by: discouraging escape, inciting
higher levels of motivation, providing legitimacy to the
group and its commander, fostering group cohesion, and
intimidating civilian populations [31]. Other scholars
have documented how magical beliefs can serve highly
specific strategic functions in armed groups in Africa
[32–34].
Findings demonstrate the measures taken by the LRA
to force recruits coming from outside of Uganda to feel,
if not equally loyal, at least equally bound to the group.
This appeared to be achieved through re-formulating
some of the most basic concepts of social bonding, for
example the concept of a “family” unit. Abductees are
also systematically prevented from forming relationships
with those from their own culture. Children are coerced
into keeping silent until they learn the Acholi language
and stop using their own. And finally, the constant
movement and transience may make it difficult for
abductees to create ties with a stable home community
upon their return. The results presented here provide
qualitative support for the finding from Betanacourt et
al that certain forms of violence – killing and rape – are
particularly traumatic for children associated with armed
groups. These forms of violence, because of their in-
tense social taboo and associated stigma may be among
the most effective at preventing children from feeling
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that they can escape the group and return to a normal
life. A recent qualitative study from those associated
with the LRA outside of Uganda emphasized the extent
to which being forced to commit violence and murder,
particularly against those in one’s own family, served as
a way to disconnect people psychologically from their
civilian past and was interpreted by those abducted as a
way to communicate that there is no way to return to
their past life [31].
In this study, being forced to kill and experiencing sex-
ual slavery were defining aspects of the indoctrination
process, and the forced formation of an LRA-type iden-
tity. Additionally, the descriptions of language control,
of forced isolation, and of the assignment to family units
where long-term combatants could model and enforce
“approved” behaviours, speak to highly systematic ways
of forcing the formation of a new identity.
Gender differences emerged in how youth were treated
and indoctrinated. Girls are assigned as cooks, carriers,
and wives of senior LRA combatants. They often face
control not only by their combatant “husband” but also
by other women who act as wives in this “family” group.
In contrast, boys first act as transporters and, with time,
gain increasing responsibility as combatants. Violent rit-
uals, as well as tests to prove loyalty, often mark the
transition to becoming a combatant. While both boys
and girls face control, fear and violence, the character of
their experiences may be markedly different. Girls suffer
physical and sexual violence within their family units.
Boys face physical violence and domination as they are
molded into potential fighters. These findings highlight a
changing approach to women by the LRA. Female
abductees were trained as combatants during the LRA’s
activities in Uganda [35, 36]. However, as the group
became weakened after its dispersal to other countries,
the majority of those trained for combat were boys and
young men. Recent interviews with long term LRA com-
batants describe how currently, women and girls
abducted into the group after this time served as “wives”
and servants. Only those women who were unable to
fulfill these roles due to disability or undesirability were
put on the frontlines of fighting [31].
All of these realities have consequences for those indi-
viduals seeking to rebuild their lives in civilian commu-
nities once they leave the LRA. Upon reintegration into
their communities of origin, abductees must re-create
social bonds, communicate with family and acquain-
tances, and regain autonomy over daily activities that
were once dictated by others. Recognizing these realities
in programming is important. Returnees may experience
mental health issues, may be at increased risk of re-
recruitment, and may be more vulnerable to exploitation
[11, 37, 38]. Former child soldiers associated with the
LRA in Uganda report experiencing stigma from host
communities, though this may decrease over time [39],
and former child soldiers in the conflict in eastern DRC
reported significant stigma from host communities,
which is expressed through name-calling and social
ostracization [40].
Psychosocial interventions should therefore address
not only individual healing of former abductees, but
focus on helping these individuals once again build com-
munication and trust skills with family members and
peers. A randomized control trial conducted in LRA af-
fected areas in DRC for war-affected boys, including
former child soldiers, found that cognitive behavioural
therapy (CBT) modified to be culturally relevant, proved
effective in improving mental health [41]. Another study
enrolled 159 war-affected youth in LRA-affected Haut-
Uele Province of DRC into a community-participative
psychosocial intervention involving trainings with life
skills and relaxation. Immediately post-intervention, youth
showed significantly lower post-traumatic stress reactions
compared to controls and positive effects continued to be
evident three months post-intervention [42].
Previous studies from Sierra Leone highlight the fact
that disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) programs are often deeply inadequate to address
the long-term mental health and economic needs of
former child soldiers [37], and highlight the unique
needs of girls and women associated with armed groups
[43]. Qualitative data from former child soldiers and
community members participating in DDR processes in
eastern DRC suggest a number of promising practices,
including promoting community and family involvement
at all stages of reintegration programming, and training
local service providers to provide counseling to former
child soldiers and their families [40]. These findings echo
research done in LRA-affected areas in Uganda. There,
resources seen as important for reintegration were: spir-
itual healing and religion; sensitization messaging for
stigma reduction; counseling; and joint activities be-
tween community members in reintegrating individuals
[30, 39, 44–47], with an emphasis on the importance of
holistic interventions that specifically take into account
beneficiaries’ social and cultural environment. Home
visits and counseling messages with a spiritual or reli-
gious message have also been found to help address
trauma [48, 49]. Holistic interventions that involve posi-
tive social interactions between community members,
care givers and abductees have been recommended in
other LRA-affected contexts [47], as have short-term
trauma-focused treatment for those most highly affected
by violence [12].
Limitations
Findings should be considered in light of several limitations.
The generalizability of findings beyond the geographic areas
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included in our study is unclear. Security and logistical con-
straints rendered some regions, including the highly im-
pacted Bas Uele region, inaccessible. Despite efforts to
include a diversity of experiences, our sample is limited to
those that were most accessible. We were not able to in-
clude youth still part of the LRA; they may have had quali-
tatively different indoctrination experiences. Despite efforts
to ensure accuracy in transcription and translation, includ-
ing clarifying concepts during interviews and debriefing
after interviews to confirm accuracy, some information
may have been lost.
Conclusion
The LRA exercises extensive behavioral and psycho-
logical control over its new recruits in northeastern
DRC. This study provides one of the first detailed explo-
rations of the social and psychological mechanisms
through which this is achieved following expansion of
this group’s activities beyond Uganda. Understanding
abductees’ experiences is critical to guide reintegration
programs for youth, such as DDR programs. Findings
emphasize the need to consider indoctrination processes
specific to the LRA experience when planning reintegra-
tion activities. As described here, indoctrination into the
LRA has unique aspects compared to many other armed
groups. Realizing the far-reaching consequences of this,
and how it affects individuals and the ways in which they
interact with others and conceptualize social interac-
tions, is critical for responding to the needs of child sol-
diers, and improving child health in conflict-affected
regions. These results speak to the need for holistic pro-
grams targeted at trauma healing and reconciliation that
involve both former abductees and community members.
Endnotes
1More recently, Lingala and Kiswahili are have also been
spoken by the LRA, but Acholi remains the language
spoken by the top leadership and many of the combatants.
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